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ESSAY
The Futility of Walls: How Traveling
Corporations Threaten State Sovereignty
Darren Rosenblum*
Inversions-mergers in which one firm merges with another abroad to avoid taxes in its
home country-have spread as globalization has reduced many of the transactional costs
associated with relocating. As firms acquire the power to choose the laws that govern them,
they challenge the sovereignty of nation-states, who find their ability to tax and regulate firms
depleted States andfinns compete in a game of cat and mouse to adapt to this new global
reality. The subversion ofstate power by thesefirms reveals the futility ofwalls, both literal and
regulatory. This Essay describes the phenomenon of these "traveling corporations" and
analyzes several remedies that could limit future mergers. We conclude by arguing that
inversions provoke deglobalization and yet may continue to flourish despite it asfinns take the
lead in dictating global norms.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Wisconsin-based Johnson Controls, founded over 125 years ago,
got its start by introducing a room thermostat to the market.! In 2016,
Johnson Controls merged with the Irish firm Tyco? In 2015, Johnson
Controls paid an effective tax rate of nineteen percent, whereas Tyco's
tax rate was only fourteen percent.3 Recognizing the opportunity to
significantly reduce its tax liability, Johnson Controls merged with
Tyco and shifted its headquarters abroad.' Johnson Controls's
relocation from Milwaukee to Cork proved a banner day for the firm.
In one transaction, Johnson Controls saved "at least $150 million a year
on taxes" by moving its headquarters abroad.
Such "inversion" mergers realize radical tax benefits thanks to the
impact of globalization, which has effectively reduced significant
transactional costs that would otherwise deter firms from relocating.6
The rise of globalization has led to the increasing frequency of mergers,
1. Leslie Picker, Tyco Merger Will Shif Johnson Controls' Tax Liability Overseas,
N.Y. TIMEs (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/26/business/dealbook/johnson-
controls-to-combine-with-tyco-in-tax-inversion-deal.html.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id
5. Bob Tita & Dana Mattioli, Johnson Controls, Tyco to Merge in Inversion Deal,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/johnson-controls-tyco-to-merge-in-
inversion-deal-1453724828.
6. Jed Greer & Kavaljit Singh, A Brief History of Transnational Corporations,
GLOBAL POL'Y F. (2000), https://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/47068-a-brief-history-of-
transnational-corporations.html ("In 1970, there were some 7,000 parent TNCs, while today
that number has jumped to 38,000. 90 percent of them are based in the industrialised world,
which control over 207,000 foreign subsidiaries.").
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which have increased the reach of globalization, each contributing to
the other. The ability and ease with which firms can relocate has thus
contributed to globalization, which has impacted every firm, industry,
market, and country in the world. Firms can mutate to avoid or
minimize states' capture of their resources, effectively "vot[ing] with
their feet" by relocating to more accommodating jurisdictions. Firms
not only judiciously select which state's rules govern their contracts,
but they also determine the laws that regulate them.' For example, they
can select taxation rules in jurisdictions with light tax burdens and
avoid states with more weighty tax rules.' Thanks to their capacity to
relocate based on legal frameworks, we call such firms "traveling
corporations."
The Johnson Controls-Tyco merger, however, did not go wholly
unnoticed. Both 2016 presidential candidates opposed U.S. firms
relocating to avoid paying taxes.'o The threat inversions pose to state
sovereignty may have also played a role in the widespread hostility
towards the Johnson Controls-Tyco merger. In our globalized and
largely privatized world, firms often command more informational and
financial capital than even the most powerful states. Despite this
reality, states and civil society leaders continue to pretend that we live
in a world of Westphalian sovereignty in which states control their
borders, what occurs within them, and what passes across them."
While globalization in general and inversions in particular do not
obviate a state's utility, sovereignty has markedly diminished as firms
7. Tsilly Dagan, Pay as You Wish: Globalization, Forum Shopping, and Distributive
Justice 3 (June 10, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssm.com/abstract-2457212.
8. See William J. Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, 72 VAND. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019).
9. Id
10. Then-presidential candidate Hillary Clinton chastised the move, describing such
mergers as "efforts to shirk U.S. tax obligations [and] leave American taxpayers holding the
bag while corporations juice more revenues and profits." Ginger Gibson, Hillary Clinton Calls
Johnson Controls-Tyco Inversion "Outrageous," REUTERS (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-clinton-inversion/hillary-clinton-calls-johnson-controls-
tyco-inversion-outrageous-idUSKCNOV320L. Clinton had expressed a sentiment that even
candidate Trump could not refute, stating that one of his goals was to "end job-killing corporate
inversions, and cause trillions in new dollars and wealth to come pouring into [the United
States]." Donald Trump, Republican Presidential Nominee, Address at Detroit Economic Club
Unveiling Economic Plan (Aug. 8, 2016) (transcript available at https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-
blog/campaign/290777-transcript-of-donald-trumps-economic-policy-speech-to-detroit).
11. Stephen D. Krasner, Pervasive Not Perverse: Semi-Sovereigns as the Global
Norm, 30 CORNELL INT'LL.J. 651, 656 (1997) ("States exist in specific territories. Within these
territories, domestic political authorities are the only arbiters of legitimate behavior. The basic
rule of Westphalian sovereignty is non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states.").
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increasingly exercise their ability to establish global norms for trade,
production, and consumption. Of course, states do not willingly
relinquish their authority. Rather, they attempt to maintain their
sovereignty in many ways. For example, states may resist
globalization with physical walls, but as Wendy Brown argued in
Walled States, Waning Sovereignty, these efforts often prove futile.12
States also erect barriers through laws and regulations in an attempt to
stop cross-border movement of labor, capital, and ideas.13
This Essay explores the inherent tension between nations and
firms in a globalized market and inquires whether and how states may
erect corporate laws-essentially regulatory walls-that might keep
firms domiciled within their jurisdiction despite the lure of more
favorable foreign jurisdictions. Part II will describe inversions: how
they work and why they benefit firms. Part III will evaluate proposed
remedies to restrict inversion mergers. Part IV will consider inversion
mergers through the lens of Wendy Brown's work on the futility of
walls. Part V links inversions to potential deglobalization and explains
how they may flourish despite it.
II. GLOBALIZATION, INVERSIONS, AND THE FADING POWER OF
STATES
Globalization's expansion has seen firms assemble global
empires, many of which surpass the scale of nations. In the 1980s and
1990s, as free trade expanded and tariffs fell, many fimns began to
manufacture abroad.14 Then came the wave of outsourcing-first
products, then services-to the developing world. Cross-border
mergers and acquisitions increased, always driven by synergies and
other efficiencies." Firms built or bought subsidiaries abroad, creating
a leading group of truly multinational corporations. They maximized
efficiencies of labor, capital, and natural resources in each of their
12. See generally WENDY BROWN, WALLED STATES, WANING SOVEREIGNTY (2010)
(examining physical walls among nation-states as a way of rejecting globalization and
projecting state power and sovereignty).
13. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 367 (2012) (governing the taxation of corporate property
transferred from the United States).
14. See Louis Uchitelle, Spread of US. Plants AbroadIs Slowing Exports, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 26, 1989), https://www.nytimes.com/1989/03/26/us/spread-of-us-plants-abroad-is-
slowing-exports.html.
15. See generally Simon J. Evenett, The Cross-Border Mergers andAcquisitions Wave
of the Late 1990s, in CHALLENGES TO GLOBALIZATION: ANALYZING THE ECONOMICS 411
(Robert E. Baldwin & L. Alan Winters eds., 2004) (describing the surge of cross-border
mergers and acquisitions in the 1990s).
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markets, leveraging global supply chains to produce the most profitable
combination of workers, products, and consumers.16 Toward the end
of the first decade, it became clear that law was just another efficiency
to maximize. Modem corporations, unmoored from their national
origins, relocate with relative ease.
A. Inversions, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Traveling
Corporation
A corporate inversion is a transaction in which a U.S. firm
"restructures and reincorporates in a foreign country."" Multinational
corporations are incredibly complex; accordingly, there are myriad
factors that motivate firms to invert. However, no matter how a CEO
might frame the transaction to the public, tax consequences are at the
heart of every inversion.
Regulatory arbitrage, the method firms use to game which
regulations will apply to them, provides large firms with substantial
advantages." A common example of regulatory arbitrage is when a
firm terminates an employee, only to rehire the same employee as an
independent contractor to avoid employment regulations.19 Regulatory
arbitrage is perfectly legal in the United States, and firms utilize it
regularly to minimize the effects of unfavorable regulations-tax or
otherwise.20
However, inversions represent a new and extreme version of
regulatory arbitrage that is unprecedented in scope and impact. It is a
prime example of how "states have lost to the ungovernable forces
'unleashed by globalization."' 2 1  Sophisticated lawyers and
accountants that successfully navigate around regulatory regimes have
begun to undermine state sovereignty. This cadre of sophisticated
16. See generally Greer & Singh, supra note 6 (detailing the history of transnational
corporations in light of globalization).
17. Caroline L. Harris, Corporate Inversions: History and Impact, U.S. CHAMBER
COM. (Mar. 11, 2016), https://www.uschamber.com/series/above-the-fold/corporate-inversions-
history-and-impact.
18. Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEx. L. REV. 227, 229 (2010).
19. Naomi B. Sunshine, Employees as Price-Takers, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 105,
153 (2018).
20. See Fleischer, supra note 18, at 229.
21. Tom Vanderbilt, The Walls in Our Heads, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/11/06/opinion/sunday/the-walls-in-our-heads.html (quoting BROWN,
supra note 12, at 24).
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corporate planners structures deals that may meet the letter of the law,
but arguably undermine the spirit of it.22
The corporate mobility that inversions represent marks a radical
decline in state sovereignty, as firms grab the power to decide which
laws will govern them.2 3 In this extreme form of regulatory arbitrage,
global firms place subsidiaries and intellectual property in jurisdictions
that provide them with the most favorable business environment. Even
within the United States, jurisdictions compete openly by offering
advantageous tax rules and other regulatory benefits to global firms.24
While this gaming is not new-firms have historically attempted to
minimize their tax exposure-it has reached a new level with the recent
wave of inversion mergers crafted to avoid tax liability.
Thus, as depicted in Figure One, states and traveling corporations
find themselves in a competitive stance. One similarity between them
is governance: the laws, rules, and modus operandi by which both
states and corporations conduct their affairs. Governance is an
advanced, soft technology that reflects cultural norms and, therefore, is
not easy to adopt or port from one context to another. In that regard,
corporate governance is more malleable than nation-state governance.
The former may act freely to increase shareholder value, while the
latter must operate within constitutional and bureaucratic limitations.
Traveling corporations, bound to no stakeholder, can mutate their
governance systems at will.
22. Fleischer, supra note 18, at 229.
23. See TSLLY DAGAN, INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY BETWEEN COMPETITION AND
COOPERATION 26-30 (2018).
24. For example, in the spring of 2018, when Delta Airlines announced that it would
end its discount program for members of the National Rifle Association, Delta's home state,
Georgia, threatened to end tax breaks that Delta was receiving. In response to Georgia's threat,
several states offered Delta a new home. Scott Neuman, Georgia Lawmakers Punish Delta
Air Lines over NRA Feud, NPR (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/
2018/03/02/59014992 1/georgia-lawmakers-punish-delta-air-lines-over-nra-feud.
[Vol. 93:645650
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Figure 1
Traditional Firm/State Competition
National Competition
Firm Competition
New Paradigm
The intellectual property battle between Samsung and Apple
provides an example of how traveling corporations have shifted the
competitive stance between firms and states. Apple and Samsung are
the two largest manufacturers of mobile phones.25 Beyond phones, the
firms have divergent market shares in distinct product lines. The
overlap is undeniable, and their market shares in key countries rival
each other. Consumers, media commentators, and scholarly observers
commonly view their relationship as a typical clash of the titans.26
Despite their similarities, the firms operate with highly distinct
relationships toward their home states. Apple has often had an
adversarial relationship with the U.S. government. At a 2011 dinner,
25. Don Reisinger, SamsungIs Back atop the Smartphone Market, FORTUNE (Apr. 11,
2017), http://fortune.com/2017/04/11 /samsung-apple-market-share/.
26. See, e.g., Jeremy Wagstaff & Miyoung Kim, Apple and Samsung: A Defining
Rivalry in a Changed Mobile Market, REUTERS (Dec. 7, 2012), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-apple-samsung/apple-and-samsung-a-defining-rivalry-in-a-changed-mobile-market-
idUSBRE8B61B220121207; Rivalry Between Apple and Samsung in Smartphones Will Grow
Fiercer, ECONOMIST (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.economist.com/business/2017/09/14/
rivahy-between-apple-and-samsung-in-smartphones-will-grow-fiercer.
6512019]
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President Barack Obama met with Apple CEO Steve Jobs to encourage
greater U.S. domestic production of Apple products.27 Unrepentant,
Apple executives asserted that the United States simply did not have
the labor force or regulatory flexibility to increase its U.S.-based
production.28 Apple products would remain designed in California, but
produced elsewhere, largely in China.29 Security has been another
source of tension: in 2016 Apple fought a federal court order requiring
them to write code to allow the FBI to bypass the security features on
the iPhone of one of the shooters involved in the San Bernadino
massacre.30 Finally, several U.S. political and business leaders have
derided firms such as Apple that bank hundreds of billions of dollars in
profits outside the United States to avoid tax liability.3 1
In marked contrast, Samsung's relationship with the state of South
Korea is successfully interwoven. As with many corporatist firms, the
state plays a central role, and in turn, Samsung's success is critical to
South Korea's economic prowess. It accounts for one-fifth of South
Korean exports and nearly one-fifth of its gross domestic product.32
The tightly intertwined relationship between South Korea and
27. At a presidential dinner with several of Silicon Valley's leaders, President Obama
asked Steve Jobs about bringing jobs back to the United States and Jobs said, "Those jobs
aren't coming back." Charles Duhigg & Keith Bradsher, How the US. Lost Out on iPhone
Work, N.Y. TrIES (Jan. 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/business/apple-
america-and-a-squeezed-middle-class.html. Jobs's successor, Tim Cook, has promised to
bring some jobs back. Jay Yarow, Here's How Many Jobs Apple Will Bring to the US to Make
Macs, Bus. INSIDER (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-how-many-jobs-
apple-will-bring-to-the-us-to-make-macs-2013-2.
28. See Duhigg & Bradsher, supra note 27.
29. Yoni Heisler, Barack Obama References Apple During State ofthe Union Speech,
NETWORK WORLD (Feb. 13, 2013), https://www.networkworld.com/article/2224030/data-
center/barack-obama-references-apple-during-state-of-the-union-speech.html.
30. Matthew J. Weber, Warning-Weak Password: The Courts' Indecipherable
Approach to Encryption and the Fifth Amendment, 2016 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 455, 475-
76 (2016). This article explains how the front-end encryption on certain messaging apps causes
further friction between tech companies and the government, increasing their competition with
each other. Id. at 459-60. Weber explains that when tech companies are served with a warrant
they typically provide the requested information "if they have access to it, and have no reason
to object" to the warrant. Id. at 459. This is still likely the case, but with the "prevalence of
encrypted messaging like iMessage and WhatsApp, the [companies] often do not have access
to the unencrypted data." Id. at 459-60 (footnotes omitted).
31. See, e.g., Renae Merle, Obama Criticizes Companies That Leave US. for Lower
Taxes, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/
obama-companies-that-denounce-us-citizenship-for-lower-taxes-are-insidious/2016/04/05/cf
43a2bc-fb4l-11e5-886f-a037dba38301_story.htmlutm term=.2bb0d80a2294.
32. James Estrin, Samsung and the South Korean Success Story, N.Y. TIMES: LENS
(Nov. 13, 2015), https://lens.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/11/13/samsung-and-the-south-korean-
success-story/.
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Samsung has led some in the press to call the country the "Republic of
Samsung." 33 Such domination by one firm used to exist in the United
States-where it was once colloquially said that "[a]s General Motors
goes, so goes the nation." 34  This paradigm is no longer-the U.S.
economy has diversified, and many of its firms have gone on to become
traveling corporations.
Thus, to sum up the typical narrative about the Apple-Samsung
dispute, we have two companies battling for global market share-one
with close links to its host nation and one without. At the national level,
the United States and South Korea present distinct state contexts in
which firms operate; these nations compete for investment and trade,
even as they cooperate through a contested but successfully negotiated
bilateral trade agreement. 35 However, this narrative presumes above all
that the United States and South Korea have dominion over Apple and
Samsung, respectively. In reality, in many cases firms such as Apple
have exceeded the framework of the Westphalian nation-state.
Intellectual property plays a central role in the life of a traveling
corporation, which depends on certain property regimes to amass and
maintain capital." Firms like Apple protect their intellectual property
rights by locating them in jurisdictions where they are most secure. In
this way, firms cherry-pick nations based on the laws concerning
intellectual property, taxes, and other regulatory structures, and they
subdivide to maximize profit.
Not all multinationals challenge state sovereignty, however.
Indeed, Samsung plays by rules set in the twentieth century, in which
33. See, e.g, Chico Harlan, In S. Korea, the Republic ofSamsung, WASH. POST (Dec.
9, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-s-korea-the-republic-of-samsung/2012/
12/09/71215420-3del- 1e2-bca3-aadc9b7e29c5_story.html?utm term-.2d8dccec474d.
34. See As GM Goes, So Goes..., NATION: TOMDISPATCH (Feb. 23, 2009), https://
www.thenation.com/article/gm-goes-so-goes. As Charles Wilson, former President of General
Motors, said in a confirmation hearing for his nomination to serve as Secretary of Defense, "I
cannot conceive of [a situation where the United States and General Motors had adverse
interests] because for years I thought what was good for our country was good for General
Motors, and vice versa. The difference did not exist. Our company is too big." Ellen Terrell,
When a Quote Is Not (Exactly) a Quote: General Motors, LIBR. CONGRESS: INSIDE ADAMS (Apr.
22,2016), https://blogs.loc.gov/insideadams/2016/04/when-a-quote-is-not-exactly-a-quote-
general-motors/.
35. See United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement, S. Kor.-U.S., June 30, 2007,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-text [hereinafter
KORUS FTA].
36. CHRISTOPHER MAY, A GLOBAL POLITICAL EcONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS 17 (2000) ("[T]he actual appearance of property as an institution . .. protects certain
interests in society in a specific manner.").
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large firms functioned in tandem with the states in which they resided.
Samsung's close links with the South Korean government provide it
with regulatory benefits, tax benefits, and access to capital it might not
receive if it were any other company. Much of this connection may
veer toward corruption, and indeed that word has been used to describe
some aspects of Samsung's relationship with the South Korean state.38
At the same time, Samsung's link with South Korea frames its
competition with Apple not only as a competition between a South
Korean firm and a U.S. firm, but perhaps more importantly as one
between a traditional multinational and a traveling corporation.
In the context of Apple and Samsung, the link to the state could
not be more divergent. For Apple, the United States is a competitor,
both ranking their need for profits or tax revenue as paramount.
Samsung may achieve similar ends from South Korea-avoiding tax
liability for instance--but it does so in concert with the state.
Evolutionary dynamic theory involves understanding how beings
evolve in relation to each other.39 In this model, Apple and the United
States evolve against each other, while Samsung and South Korea
evolve together, as co-dependent species in a symbiotic relationship,
against other predators and prey-the United States and Apple, for
instance.
We attempt to account for these perspectives in Figure Two by
examining the state-centered framework, the traveling corporation
framework, and how they interact within the Apple-Samsung dispute.
37. See, e.g., Harlan, supra note 33.
38. See id; see also Sam Kim, Samsung's Jay Y Lee Set Free in Unexpected Court
Reversal, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-05/
samsung-heir-jay-y-lee-goes-free-after-court-suspends-jail-term (discussing deep concerns
about Samsung's relationship with South Korea after Samsung's Vice Chairman's prison
sentence for bribery was suspended by an appeals court in February 2018).
39. See generally Daria Roithmayr, Evolutionary Dynamics Theory and Method, in
METHODOLOGrES OF LAW AND EcoNoMICS 153 (Thomas S. Ulen ed., 2017) (using
evolutionary dynamics theory to analyze the ever-evolving relationship between the
government and regulated entities).
654 [Vol. 93:645
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Figure 2
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National Competition
Firm Competition
State A
t
Firm A
New Paradigm
4
Stae9
State B
t
Firm B
Apple/Samsung Competition
U.S. State
t
Apple
SState
9 FK.
Figure Two depicts the contrast between the evolving paradigm
of relationships among firms and states. The figure makes it clear that
traveling corporations sit outside the state in which they came into
being. Of course, this is not entirely accurate because firms such as
Apple do have deep links to their home states, but those links are far
fewer than was traditionally the case. Many such firms draw greater
2019]
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revenue from abroad than from their home state and some even have
more employees abroad. 40 However, as the third frame representing
2015-2017 depicts, traveling corporations relate differently to their
home state and to other firms and other states.
B. The Risks Inversions Pose
Economist Dani Rodrik described the relationship between
governments and global markets:
Th[e] imbalance between the national scope of governments and
the global nature of markets forms the soft underbelly of globalization.
A healthy global economic system necessitates a delicate compromise
between these two. Give too much power to governments, and you have
protectionism and autarky. Give markets too much freedom, and you
have an unstable world economy with little social and political support
from those it is supposed to help.4 1
The increase of inversion activity shows little sign of slowing due
to the unique negotiating posture of inversion transactions. In every
deal, there are three distinct parties: the buyer, the seller, and the state.42
The government's position, outlined by laws and regulations, is often
the least flexible, unless, of course, a party has the regulator's ear.
These generally nonnegotiable positions set the parameters within
which the other parties must work.4 3 Of course, once the government
realizes it has been bargained around, it will adapt its position, like any
predator, by enacting new rules and laws, in an effort to prevent what
has already happened.4 4
40. See U.N. Conference on Trade & Development, World Investment Report 2018,
Web Annex Table 19: The World's Top 100 Non-Financial MNEs, Ranked by Foreign Assets,
2017 (June 6, 2018), https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment/2OReport/
Annex-Tables.aspx (demonstrating that Exxon Mobil's foreign sales account for sixty-five
percent of total sales and foreign employment accounts for fifty-eight percent of total
employment).
41. DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX: DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF
THE WORLD ECONOMY, at xvi (2011).
42. See id. at 13-14.
43. To be sure, the state, through its agencies, is open to some negotiation as evidenced
by the October 2016 amendment of the proposed April 2016 regulations targeting earnings
stripping. See discussion infra Part 111.B.3. However, the state is not necessarily a party at the
table when a proposed inversion deal is being planned, effectively making its position a known
quantity to plan around.
44. See Roithmayr, supra note 39, at 153.
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U.S. political parties have never been as polarized as they are
today.4 5  Even during this time of unparalleled divisiveness,
Republicans and Democrats agree on one thing: inversions should be
discouraged.4 6 Both sides of the aisle fear an eroding tax base.4 7
Corporate tax revenue accounted for around seven percent of all federal
tax revenue in 2017.48 According to a congressional study, inversions
will cost the United States approximately two billion dollars per year
over the next decade.4 9
Although U.S. tax law is notoriously complex, the result of an
eroding tax base is surprisingly straightforward: a government with a
smaller tax base will either need to cut spending without lowering
taxes, or borrow and increase the deficit to compensate for the lost
revenue.5 o The only alternative is to increase the taxes levied on the
remaining taxpayers." Neither taxpaying citizens nor elected officials
hoping to stay in office would find the aforementioned options viable.
While inversions pose a threat to a state's tax revenue, the real threat to
states' revenue collection lies in firms' ability to dictate the terms of
taxation because of their ability to choose a more advantageous
45. Philip Bump, Political Polarization Is Getting Worse. Everywhere., WASH. POST
(Apr. 9,2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/04/09/polarization-is-
getting-worse-in-every-part-of-politics/?utm term-.32bae4d55 1d8.
46. James Hitchcock, Trump on Corporate Inversion: These People Have No Loyalty
to This Country, REALCLEARPoLITcs (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/
video/2015/08/17/trumponcorporateinversion_these people havenojloyaltyto thisco
untry.html (quoting then-presidential candidate Trump as saying that inverting companies
"have no loyalty to this country .... [a]nd we have to do something"); Toluse Olorunnipa,
Obama Calls Inversions 'Insidious, 'Praising New Treasury Rules, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 5,
2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-05/obama-calls-inversions-
insidious-praising-new-treasury-rules (noting that President Obama has called loopholes
allowing inversions "unpatriotic").
47. Jared Bernstein, Protecting the Tax Base: Why It's Important to Block Tax
Inversions, WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/
wp/2015/11/19/protecting-the-tax-base-why-its-important-to-block-tax-inversions/?utm term
=.1d3824155a9e.
48. Kimberly Amadeo, Current U.S. Federal Government Tax Revenue, BALANCE,
https://www.thebalance.com/current-u-s-federal-government-tax-revenue-3305 7 62 (last
updated Oct. 12, 2018). However, some scholars argue that estimates of losses of tax revenue
from inversions are often overstated because the government recaptures as much as thirty-nine
percent of lost revenue when capital gains taxes are levied against shareholders after a firm
inverts. See Anton Babkin et al., Are Corporate Inversions Good for Shareholders?, 126 J.
FIN. EcoN. 227,228,238 n.17 (2017).
49. Zachary R. Mider, 'Unpatriotic Loophole' Targeted by Obama Costs $2
Billion, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 2, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-
02/-unpatriotic-loophole-targeted-by-obama-costs-2-billion.
50. Bernstein, supra note 47.
51. Id
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jurisdiction. The eroding tax base is especially hard to accept when the
firms that invert often do so in form only, while substantively
remaining in the United States to take advantage of the country's hard
and soft infrastructure.5 2
However, a dwindling tax base is not the only risk inversions
pose. Inversions also threaten the sovereignty of states. As depicted in
Figure One, inversions shift the competitive posture of both states and
firms, ultimately undermining the inherent power of the state. States
must no longer merely compete with each other; they now must also
compete with firms. Traveling corporations effectively sit outside of
the state and command significant influence over competing
jurisdictions. This dynamic subverts states' dominion over firms and
signals the power that firms-not states-have over global norms.
Accordingly, inversions not only threaten the United States' tax base,
but they also pose a real threat to its power.
C Globalization's Effect on Tax Law
Tax law has long been the unquestioned mechanism for blocking
inversions because it only involves one distortion, whereas non-tax-
based rules typically implicate double distortions.53 For a long time,
legislators and jurists have presumed the efficacy of tax law, but
academics have questioned this premise.54 Conventional wisdom
provides that in a closed, national-level economy taxes may be the best
way to redistribute resources, but in her article Pay As You Wish, Tsilly
Dagan concludes that in a global context, state redistribution may not
achieve its desired goals.
52. Id
53. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System I Less Efficient Than the
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667-68 (1994) (outlining the
general advantages of using tax laws for redistribution); see Dagan, supra note 7, at 3
(discussing the double distortion created by non-tax based rules by explaining that "high taxes
will distort people's incentives to work as opposed to engage in leisure activities, [while] tort
rules favoring poor fishermen over rich yacht-owners will distort the latter's incentives not
only to produce income over leisure but also to take the optimal level of precaution"). For the
purposes of this Essay, "distortion" refers to altered behaviors resulting from intervention by a
governing body in the market. A classic example is progressive income taxation: because
increased earnings results in increased taxation, some people may be discouraged to increase
their earnings to avoid additional taxation.
54. See Richard S. Markovits, Why Kaplow and Shavell's "Double-Distortion
Argument " Articles Are Wrong, 13 GEO. MASON L. REv. 511 (2005).
55. See Dagan, supra note 7, at 29.
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There is positive correlation between the efficacy of a rule and the
cost of avoiding it.56 Particularly relevant here, the cost of avoiding
unfavorable tax jurisdictions in a globalized marketplace can be
relatively small.s" The rise of globalization has made it easier than ever
to avoid jurisdictions with unfavorable taxation schemes," as
evidenced by the recent spike in inversion activity.
However, because all rules can be opted out of to some degree,
the most successful rules are those that are globally harmonized.59
While the lure of a jurisdiction with lower corporate taxes and an
equally capable workforce might compel some firms to relocate, if the
foreign jurisdiction has essentially the same tax rules as its home
jurisdiction, the desire to move abroad would be much weaker. Thus,
harmonization would eliminate firms shopping around for more
favorable jurisdictions.60
Global harmonization of tax law is unlikely.6 1 However,
eliminating striking gaps in tax treatment between similarly situated
states is more plausible,6 2 as evidenced by the United States' most
recent tax law.63  Harmonization may succeed, but it may also
incentivize free riding, in which firms will shift their activity to seek
legal regimes that are less harmonized and less redistributive.' That
is, even if states achieved some tax harmonization, firms would likely
devise a way to alter their behavior to fall outside of the harmonized
scheme to take advantage of disharmony elsewhere.
56. Id. at 5.
57. Id. at 15.
58. Id. at 3.
59. Id at 25.
60. Id
61. Emily Chasan, International Tax Harmonization Less Appealing to CFOs:
Survey, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 4, 2012), https://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2012/09/04/intemational-
tax-harmonization-less-appealing-to-cfos-survey/ (surveying multinational corporate CFOs
and concluding that less than forty percent of American CFOs believe harmonization is
desirable, while less than thirty percent believe it is achievable, a decrease from prior survey
years); Robert Goulder, Global Tax Harmonization and Other Impossible Things, TAX
ANALYsTs (June 5, 2015, 8:36 AM), http://www.taxhistory.org/taxcom/taxblog.nsf/
Permalink/UBEN-9X6RUL?OpenDocument (arguing that the Independent Commission for
the Reform of International Corporate Taxation's recommendations for global tax
harmonization are idealistic and current tax practices like separate entity accounting for
multinational corporations are unlikely to be reformed); see Dagan, supra note 7, at 30-32.
62. Dagan, supra note 7, at 25.
63. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054.
64. Dagan, supra note 7, at 27.
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III. INVERSION REGULATIONS: FIRMS OUTRUN THE STATE
A. Cat and Mouse
Large firms have tried to minimize tax liability since the birth of
the modem corporation. For example, in the early days of the
automobile industry, Henry Ford refrained from paying out dividends
to avoid taxation on that income."s Instead, he invested the profits to
the dismay of the Dodge brothers, minority shareholders.6 6 Beyond
mere earnings management, firms choose locales based on tax
regulation and force localities to compete with tax benefits to attract
investment.67
States have always faced challenges to ensure that firms within
their borders pay taxes. States adopted more and more sophisticated
methods to require firms to pay taxes, including more detailed
reporting and oversight requirements. In turn, firms adopted new
structures and devised new ways to allocate and declare income to
avoid tax liability. For example, some firms move intellectual property
to the most secure, low-tax home, and then allocate a larger percentage
of their profits to that very intellectual property.68 Thanks to these
techniques, the United States' high nominal corporate tax rate did not
prevent the largest U.S. companies from posting staggering profits in
2017.
In this context, we see a zero-sum, coevolutionary game of cat
and mouse in which the states, as "cats," seek to capture the resources
of the firms, as "mice."7 ' As evolutionary dynamic theory argues,
predator and prey constantly mutate to better catch or avoid capture.7
Accordingly, it is not only the state that evolves to capture the firms'
resources; the firms also evolve to avoid capture of their resources.
65. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 683 (Mich. 1919).
66. Id. at 679.
67. In another example from the automobile industry, Ypsilanti, Michigan, offered tax
credits to General Motors to draw them to build and maintain a car factory in the town. The
firm began to lose money and cancelled the effort, leading it to withdraw from the town. The
town sued with a promissory estoppel argument but lost. Charter Twp. of Ypsilanti v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich. Ct App. 1993).
68. See, e.g., Stephen C. Loomis, The Double Irish Sandwich: Reforming Overseas
Tax Havens, 43 ST. MARY'S L.J. 825 (2012).
69. Theo Francis & Thomas Gryta, US. Companies Post Profit Growth Not Seen in
Six Years, WALL ST. J. (July 30, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-washington-stalls-
company-profits-keep-trucking-1501423201.
70. See Roithmayr, supra note 39, at 153, 174 (explaining that regulators and those
they regulate are engaged in a "cat-and-mouse game" of regulatory avoidance).
71. See id. at 174.
660 [Vol. 93:645
THE FUTILITY OF WALLS
Inversions provide a perfect example: states are locked into a
coevolutionary game with sophisticated corporate planners who
nimbly structure combinations around the state's most recent rules.
These cat and mouse antics played out by the government and
corporate planners are only successful in the short term-if at all.
In this cat and mouse game, inversions provide firms-the
"mice"7-with an incredible innovation. In order to better capture
revenue, states adapt as well, albeit to a lesser extent; because states
depend on tax revenue to operate, their incentive could not be greater.
With the extensive support of global accounting and law firms,
traveling corporations display far greater efficacy in mutating to evade
"predators." Through inversion mergers, powerful firms manipulate
the global trading system to permit restructuring that enables them to
avoid state claims to tax profits and, in some instances, grow larger than
states. This Part will explore the various, mostly failed, regulatory
attempts by the United States to capture a slice of the record profits
firms have logged.
B. Previous Efforts to Stop Inversions
1. 1996: The Helen of Troy Inversion
In 1993, Helen of Troy, a U.S.-based cosmetics company,
instigated a tax-free inversion transaction through which it became the
subsidiary of a Bermuda shell corporation.7 2 Believing the transaction
was motivated by a desire to avoid U.S. taxes, the Treasury Department
took aim at inversions in 1996 and promulgated a regulation that made
shareholder gains on inversions taxable." However, this regulation,
focused only on shareholder income, did little to stop U.S. firms from
inverting.74 Despite the Treasury's best efforts to foreclose inversions,
U.S. firms increasingly undertook inversions." As Congress looked
72. Brandon Hayes, U.S. Anti-Inversion Provisions, INT'L TAX REV. (Mar. 27, 2013),
http://www.intemationaltaxreview.com/Article/3181949/US-anti-inversion-provisions.html.
73. 26 U.S.C. § 367 (2012); Harris, supra note 17.
74. Harris, supra note 17.
75. Roberto A. Ferdman, 30 Years of Companies Abandoning the US. for Lower
Taxes, in One Chart, WASH. POST (July 8, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2014/07/08/30-years-of-companies-abandoning-the-u-s-for-lower-taxes-in-one-
chart/?utm term=.5cc8932fad49.
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more closely at the increased inversion activity, it concluded that tax
avoidance was the driving force behind the surge of inversions. 6
2. The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004
Subsequently, Congress passed the American Jobs Creation Act
of 2004, which required U.S. firms undertaking inversions to have
"substantial business activities" in foreign jurisdictions if the inversion
was to be respected for tax purposes.77 The Treasury Department
subsequently defined "substantial business activity" as a company
having at least twenty-five percent of its employees, assets, and income
located in, or derived from, the relevant foreign country.78 The
substantial business activity regulation also proved futile in slowing
inversions because it coincided with an increased desire for firms to
expand globally, so shifting operations abroad not only provided tax
benefits but also matched business objectives.79
The Treasury's ever-changing regulations typify the cat and
mouse game between the state and firms. In fact, inversion deal
closings would often create a "domino effect" because of the group
rush to finalize transactions before the Treasury enacted rules aimed at
proposed deals.o Each new wave of deals would bring new
regulations-further proof that the state's inherent power is fading as
multinational firms play a significant role in shaping the state's
rulemaking.
3. The April 2016 Proposed Regulations
The recent proposed inversion between pharmaceutical giant,
Pfizer, and Allergan, an Ireland-based pharmaceutical company, was
the driving force behind yet another round of proposed Treasury
Department regulations announced in April 2016." The first feature of
76. Harris, supra note 17; see also Hayes, supra note 72 (suggesting that the 1996
regulation failed because it only levied taxes on the U.S. shareholders of multinational
corporations).
77. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No 108-357, § 801, 118 Stat. 1418,
1563.
78. 26 C.F.R. § 1.7874-3 (2018).
79. Harris, supra note 17.
80. Shayndi Raice, How Tax Inversions Became the Hottest Trend in M&A, WALL ST.
J. (Aug. 5, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-tax-inversions-became-the-hottest-trend-
in-m-a-1407240175 (quoting a tax partner at Hogan Lovells).
81. Press Release, Allergan, Pfizer and Allergan to Combine (Nov. 23, 2015),
https://www.allergan.com/news/news/thomson-reuters/pfizer-and-allergan-to-combine. The
proposed $150 billion deal was poised to be the largest inversion to date. Richard Rubin & Liz
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the regulations would have effectively reduced the size of a foreign
entity by ignoring the foreign entity's combinations with U.S. firms for
the previous three years.8 2  Post-inversion tax treatment would be
dependent on the proportion of U.S. shareholders relative to foreign
shareholders of the new entity. Generally, if the shareholders of the
U.S. firm own less than sixty percent of the new firm, it would receive
favorable tax treatment."
Prior to the proposed regulation, foreign firms would engage in
"serial inversions," completing several smaller combinations before
undertaking the "target" inversion.84 Serial inversions increase the
number of shareholders in the foreign firm, effectively diluting the
number of U.S. shares and making it easier for firms to remain below
the sixty-percent threshold." Under the proposed regulation, these
smaller transactions occurring within the preceding three years would
be ignored, effectively making foreign firms smaller than they appear
on paper.86
The second and perhaps more biting aspect of the proposed
regulations aimed to make acquisitions of U.S. firms less enticing to
foreign firms by retooling the treatment of related-party debt. In an
inversion deal, a subsidiary of the new parent company remains in the
United States, subject to U.S. tax laws.87 Prior to the proposed
regulation, the "real 'juice' in an inversion transaction" came in the
Hoffman, New Rules on Tax Inversions Threaten Pfizer-Allergan Deal, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 4,
2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-treasury-unveils-new-steps-to-limit-tax-inversions-1
459803636. Pfizer CEO Ian Reed publicly announced that competing with foreign rivals that
had lesser tax bills was a motivating factor behind the merger. Michael J. de la Merced et al.,
Pfizer Chief Defends Merger with Allergan as Good for US., N.Y. TIMEs (Nov. 23, 2015),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-treasury-unveils-new-steps-to-limit-tax-inversions-1459803
636.
82. Richard Rubin, Treasury's New Inversion Rules, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 5, 2016),
https://blogs.wsj.com/briefly/2016/04/05/treasurys-new-inversion-rules-at-a-glance/.
83. Id
84. See Rubin & Hoffman, supra note 81.
85. Liz Hoffman & Richard Rubin, New Inversion Rules Test Pending Deals, WALL
ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-inversion-rules-test-pending-deals-1459877333 (last
updated Apr. 5, 2016).
86. Id. For example, ignoring Allergan's combinations with U.S. firms for the three
years leading up to the proposed deal with Pfizer would have reduced Allergan's outstanding
shares from 395 million to about 130 million, leaving Allergan investors with about twenty
percent of the new Pfizer-Allergan entity, rendering the proposed deal unprofitable from a tax
perspective. Id.
87. Steven Davidoff Solomon, Corporate Inversions Aren't the Halfoflt, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/10/business/dealbook/corporate-inversions-
arent-the-half-of-it.html.
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form of the ability of the U.S. subsidiary to borrow from the parent and
offset its earnings with tax-free interest payments made to the foreign
parent company, i.e., earnings or profit stripping." Foreign
multinational firms often use earnings stripping to reduce a U.S.
subsidiary's overall tax liability because interest payments on loans are
deductible.89
The Treasury's proposed regulations would have allowed the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to reclassify many of the related-party
debt arrangements as equity, not debt." This reclassification would
have ended the practice of U.S. subsidiaries deducting large interest
payments made to its foreign parent company.9 1 The proposed
regulations have yet to take effect. In response to Executive Order
13789, the IRS identified the proposed earnings stripping rules as
meeting criteria warranting reform or full repeal.92 Ultimately, the IRS
proposed removing the final regulations.9 3
88. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Testimony of Pamela Olson, Acting
Assistant Sec'y (Tax Policy), United States Department of the Treasury Before the House
Committee on Ways and Means on Corporate Inversion Transactions (June 6, 2002),
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/po3156.aspx.
89. Solomon, supra note 87.
90. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Treasury Issues Inversion
Regulations and Proposed Earnings Stripping Regulations (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.
treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0404.aspx. Examples of instruments issued
from a parent to a U.S. subsidiary that would be subject to the reclassification are:
[I]nstrument[s] that might otherwise be considered debt if [they are] issued by a
subsidiary to its foreign parent in a shareholder dividend distribution; ... dividend
distribution[s] of debt in which a U.S. subsidiary (1) borrows cash from a related
company and (2) pays a cash dividend distribution to its foreign parent; and ...
instrument[s] that might otherwise be considered debt if [they are] issued in
connection with certain acquisitions of stock or assets from related corporations in
transactions that are economically similar to a dividend distribution.
Id.
91. See Victor Fleischer, On Inversions, the Treasury Department Drops the Gloves,
N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/business/dealbook/on-
inversions-the-treasury-department-drops-the-gloves.html (noting the legality of such
reclassification could be questionable); Richard Rubin, Treasury Announces Final Regulations
on Earnings Stripping, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/treasury-
announces-final-regulations-on-earnings-stripping-1476392428. Despite emphasizing that it
would not reclassify related-party debt incurred to fund actual business investment, the
Treasury ultimately narrowed the profit stripping provisions of the April 2016 proposed
regulations in October 2016. Id.
92. See I.R.S. Notice 2017-38, 2017-30 I.R.B. 147.
93. Proposed Removal of Section 385 Documentation Regulations, 83 Fed. Reg.
48,265 (proposed Sept. 24, 2018) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
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C. Alternative Tax Laws to Curb Inversions
Although legislators may generally oppose inversions, legislation
blocking inversions tends to diverge among party lines: the right tends
to favor reducing the corporate income tax rate, while the left favors an
exit-tax penalty for firms that choose to invert.94
1. Lowering Corporate Tax Rates
One of the most prominent features of the recent tax overhaul
passed in December 2017, discussed in greater detail in Part III.E, was
a significantly reduced corporate tax rate. While lowering the
corporate tax rate passes muster under Occam's razor, the solution is
likely not so simple.
Until the end of 2017, the United States had one of the highest
statutory corporate tax rates in the world." However, after accounting
for deductions, tax breaks, and loopholes, the effective tax rate
corporations paid was often much less. For example, from 2007 to
2011, the average effective corporate tax rate for companies with over
ten million dollars in assets was twenty-two percent." Accordingly,
U.S. firms were hardly at a disadvantage compared to their
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
counterparts, who paid an average corporate tax rate of about twenty-
five percent over the same time.97
However, if a lower corporate tax rate is intended to stop
inversions, the new rate of twenty-one percent is arguably still too high.
If legislators do not want firms to leave, the tax rate must ultimately
compete with the lowest tax rates in the world." As President Obama's
Treasury Secretary Jack Lew commented, "[E]ven if we cut our tax
rates and broaden the tax base, we would still need to enact anti-
94. See Neil Irwin, How Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump Differ on Taxes, N.Y.
T~vIES (Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/13/upshot/how-hillary-clinton-
and-donald-trump-differ-on-taxes.html.
95. Kimberly Amadeo, US Corporate Income Tax Rate, Its History and the Effective
Rate, BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/corporate-income-tax-defmition-history-
effective-rate-3306024 (last updated Aug. 19, 2018).
96. OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, AVERAGE EFFECTIVE
FEDERAL CORPORATE TAX RATES (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/tax-analysis/Documents/Average-Effective-Tax-Rates-2016.pdf.
97. Martin Sullivan, The Truth About Corporate Tax Rates, FORBES (Mar. 25, 2015),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2015/03/25/the-truth-about-corporate-tax-rates/#35
8d706a742c.
98. See id.
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inversion provisions because companies always would find countries
with near-zero rates to which they could relocate."99
For example, in 2014, Google took advantage of a quirk in the
Irish tax law that enabled the company to save $2.4 billion in
worldwide taxes by moving twelve billion dollars in profits from an
Irish subsidiary to a subsidiary in Bermuda."'o Notably, Ireland, which
taxes corporate income at 12.5%, is already a destination for firms
looking to reduce their tax burden. 1 Thus, even Ireland, the poster
child for low corporate tax rates, is losing tax revenue to sophisticated
corporate planners.
That said, lowering corporate tax rates does bring the United
States into closer harmonization with the rest of the world, which, as
Dagan points out, is the most effective way of ending inversions. 10 2
However, while complete harmonization is something that we can
aspire to, it is unlikely to ever materialize.
2. An Exit Tax
An exit tax is structured similarly to the way the United States
taxes retirement accounts of individuals who renounce their
citizenship: it would effectively impose a tax on all of a corporation's
repatriated earnings before the corporation moves abroad.103 Exit taxes
could potentially add a significant amount to the price of an inversion
deal. For example, with an exit tax in place, a firm like Amgen could
be taxed $10.5 billion before inverting.10 4 Some commentators have
called such a scheme a "sensible step" that would "throw an
impediment" into the cost-benefit calculus for firms currently
99. Jacob J. Lew, Close the Tax Loophole on Inversions, WASH. POST (July 27, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/jacob-lew-close-the-tax-loophole-on-inversions/
2014/07/27/2ea50966-141d-1 1e4-98ee-daea85133bc9_story.html.utm term=.bf776a487555.
100. Jeremy Kahn & Jesse Drucker, Google Lowered Taxes by $2.4 Billion Using
European Subsidiaries, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 19, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2016-02-19/google-lowered-taxes-by-2-4-billion-using-european-subsidiaries. For a
discussion of the mechanism by which Google attained its tax savings, see "Double Irish with
a Dutch Sandwich, " N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 28, 2012), https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.
com/interactive/2012/04/28/business/Double-Irish-With-A-Dutch-Sandwich.html?ref business;
Loomis, supra note 68, at 836-38.
101. Loomis, supra note 68, at 836 n.42.
102. See Dagan, supra note 7, at 27.
103. Mitchell A. Kane & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Taxation and International
Charter Competition, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1240 (2008).
104. Richard Rubin & Laura Meckler, Hillary Clinton Plans a Corporate "Exit Tar,"
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hillary-clinton-plans-a-corporate-
exit-tax-1449530258.
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contemplating an inversion.'o However, an exit tax is unlikely to end
inversions for good. More likely, it will just be seen as an additional
upfront cost for long-term tax benefits.
3. A Border Adjustment Tax
Another solution is to implement a border adjustment tax
(BAT)."o' The theory undergirding a BAT, with respect to inversions,
is that firms will likely be dissuaded from relocating to a foreign
jurisdiction if they know that their goods will ultimately be subject to
such a tax at the U.S. border.107  However, even President Donald
Trump has called the border adjustment tax "complicated," and such a
tax would have wide-ranging effects that go well beyond its ability to
slow inversions.o10 Most notably, by some estimates, the U.S. dollar
would have to strengthen by twenty-five percent to offset the proposed
tax because the cost of goods would increase so drastically."'
Like an exit tax, a BAT would certainly not preclude all inversions
and would have broad consequences. Tax experts say that a BAT
would have a "profound" effect on global trade, investment, and supply
chains."o Accordingly, imposing a BAT to avoid inversions does not
seem to be the most prudent path forward.
105. Id
106. A border adjustment tax is defined as:
[A]ny fiscal measures which put into effect, in whole or in part, the destination
principle (i.e. which enable exported products to be relieved of some or all of the tax
charged in the exporting country in respect of similar domestic products sold to
consumers on the home market and which enable imported products sold to
consumers to be charged with some or all of the tax charged in the importing country
in respect of similar domestic products).
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Report by the working Party on Border Tax
Adjustments, ¶ 4, GATT Doc. L/3464 (Nov. 20, 1970).
107. Alan Auerbach & Michael Devereux, The Case for a Border-Adjusted Tax, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/opinion/the-case-for-a-border-
adjusted-tax.html.
108. Id
109. See Bourree Lam, Where US. Companies Stand on the Border Adjustment Tax,
ATLArNic (Feb. 23,2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/02/companies-
border-adjustment-tax/517593/.
110. Barney Jopson et al., Trump and the Tax Plan Threatening to Split Corporate
America, FIN. TIMEs (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.ftcom/content/008532fa-efla- 11e6-baOl-
119a44939bb6.
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D. Non-Tax-Based Efforts to Control Inversions
1. Disclosure: Name and Shame
Generally, shareholders support inversions: a lower tax bill frees
capital for a variety of purposes that can increase share value.
However, in their article, Are Corporate Inversions Good for
Shareholders?, Anton Babkin, Brent Glover, and Oliver Levine
(Babkin et al.) analyzed the shareholder-specific tax consequences of
inversions and concluded that inversions create a significant agency
conflict."' Specifically, Babkin et al. found that there is dissimilar tax
treatment between shareholders based on each individual shareholder's
capital gains tax rate,112 cost basis, and age."' Accordingly, for some
shareholders, an inversion is a wealth-increasing transaction; for
others, an inversion is a wealth-decreasing event.114 Thus, the differing
tax consequences of inversions create an agency conflict between
individual shareholders and, more importantly, between shareholders
and directors.
Diverging shareholder interests are not new or necessarily
worrisome. What is concerning, however, is how executives'
ownership stakes affect their decision whether to undertake an
inversion."' While executives and shareholders might have equal
111. Babkin et al., supra note 48.
112. In 1996, the IRS retooled section 367(a) of the Internal Revenue Code so that
shareholders of an inverting company would have to realize capital gains on the underlying
transaction-even if they retained their shares in the new entity. Id. at 230. The forced
realization of capital gains has drastically different outcomes for short-term investors and long-
term investors. While short-term investors shoulder only "minimal" after-tax costs, long-term
investors planning on bequeathing their shares shoulder a much more substantial tax burden.
Id. at 232. Moreover, several classes of shareholders-like foreign investors and pension
funds-do not pay capital gains taxes. Babkin et al. characterize inversions as "a way for
shareholders to pay an upfront cost in the form of capital gains taxes to reduce the future
corporate tax liabilities of the firm." Id. at 228. However, nearly twenty percent of
shareholders shoulder the "upfront cost," to the benefit of the remaining shareholders. Id.
113. Id.at227.
114. Id. at 228.
115. Typically, executives own a combination of stocks and options as part of their
compensation. Executives' stocks are taxed like any other taxable shareholders' stock and are
subject to the same capital gains tax treatment after a merger. Id. at 244. Accordingly,
executives' compensation typically parallels that of a short-term investor-a higher basis and
a lower gain. Notably, however, executives' compensation often includes options, which are
not taxable until exercised. Id. Because unexercised options cannot capture the increased
value of the post-inversion firm, option holders have a distinct advantage over shareholders
with regard to the tax consequences of an inversion. Id. Babkin et al. estimated executives
with unexercised options earned a return of over two percent on inversion deals, while average
shareholders saw gains of less than one percent. Id Although the American Jobs Creation Act
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footing with respect to personal tax consequences of owning a
company's stock, their interests significantly diverge when unvested
stock and unexercised options are considered.1 16
Unsurprisingly, Babkin et al. found that "personal tax
consequences of [an] inversion predict the [board's] decision to
invert."l7 According to Babkin et al., an executive's decision to
undertake an inversion is affected by their personal tax liability."'
Executives with a higher potential personal gain from inverting are
more likely to invert.119 This "highlight[s] an unusual agency conflict
between different blocks of shareholders and management."1 2 0
This unique problem provides an ideal opportunity for non-tax
law to deter inversions. State corporate law exists, in large part, to deal
with agency conflicts between shareholders and management.
Accordingly, state legislatures are well situated to address the agency
conflict between executives and shareholders as a firm considers
inverting. While the agency conflict caused by disparate tax treatment
in inversion transactions does not give rise to a claim for a breach of
loyalty, diverging personal tax consequences of inversions warrant
clear and forthright disclosures about executives' holdings and their tax
consequences.
Disclosure is a central tenant of corporate law in the United
States. 121 Boards seeking shareholder approval for proposed inversions
should be required to disclose not only their compensation packages-
which is already required 2 2-but also highlight the potential disparate
post-inversion tax treatment. This is especially important given that
long-term shareholders, who have consistently backed a company,
have the most to lose.1 23 While disclosures will not bring an end to
inversions, transparency will, at worst, call attention to the fact that
provided a fifteen percent excise tax on unvested stock and unexercised option compensation
that occurs within a twelve-month window surrounding the inversion, it has merely prompted
firms to reimburse executives for the costs of the excise tax. Id at 244-45.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 245.
118. Id. at 245-46.
119. Id at 245.
120. Id at 245-46 ("Increasing the CEO's total return from the first to the third quartile
increases the probability to invert by 75.0%.").
121. Robert T. Esposito, The Social Enterprise Revolution in Corporate Law: A Primer
on Emerging Corporate Entities in Europe and the United States and the Case for the Benefit
Corporation, 4 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REV. 639, 663 (2013).
122. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2018).
123. See Babkin et al., supra note 48, at 228.
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executives and certain shareholders might reap a disproportionate
benefit compared to long-term shareholders, and at best, prove an
effective tool in slowing inversions.
2. Emerging Corporate Forms
New corporate forms, like benefit corporations, move away from
shareholder primacy toward a structure that combines social welfare
with profit motives.12 4  Benefit corporations "straddle the divide
between for-profit and nonprofit and seek to blend the production of
shareholder wealth with social and environmental goals under the
umbrella of a single entity."1 25 Lawmakers across the globe generally
support these emerging corporate forms that place the market at the
center of finding solutions to societal and environmental problems.1 26
Unlike the traditional corporation, benefit corporation boards
have a duty to consider the effects of their actions on various
stakeholders,12 7 a step beyond constituency statutes that encourage, but
do not require, directors to consider stakeholder effects.1 28  Because
boards must consider the "community in which offices or facilities of
the benefit corporation or its subsidiaries ... are located," benefit
corporations may have a more difficult time inverting.1 29
However, benefit corporations remain uncommon, and it seems
unlikely that a large corporation would contemplate a conversion. The
primary avenue by which a large multinational could be coaxed to
incorporate as a benefit corporation would be to offer tax credits or
124. Esposito, supra note 121, at 709. Benefit corporations are not to be mistaken for
B-Corporations, which are privately certified. See id at 695. U.S. citizens, shareholders, and
executives have expressed their frustration with the traditional fiduciary rule announced in
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., which demands that directors make business decisions based on
maximizing shareholder wealth. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919); Esposito, supra note 121, at
642.
125. Esposito, supra note 121, at 645.
126. Id. at 647; see also id. at 670-79 (discussing the various types of social enterprise
vehicles available in Europe).
127. Id. at 699; see, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 14620(b)(2)-(7) (West 2014) (listing seven
stakeholders directors must consider before taking action, including a benefit corporation's
employees and workforce, community and societal considerations, and the interests of the
customers of the benefit corporation).
128. Christopher Geczy et al., Institutional Investing When Shareholders Are Not
Supreme, 5 HARv. Bus. L. REv. 73, 102 (2015).
129. CoRP. § 14620(b)(4). This affirmative duty has particularly significant
consequences in the context of mergers and acquisitions. For example, many benefit
corporation statutes "require that a merger or sale must be approved by, at minimum, a two-
thirds vote, or a greater voting share as required by the articles of incorporation." Esposito,
supra note 121, at 698-99.
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other tax-based incentives.1' While such tax-based incentives also
shrink the tax base, statutory incentives are more predictable and
controllable than inverting firms. Although benefit corporations
theoretically provide a potential mechanism to curb inverting firms,
they are realistically years away from becoming either common or
adopted by large multinationals likely to invert.
E. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
On December 22, 2017, President Trump signed "the most
consequential tax legislation in three decades.""' The principal goal of
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (the Act) appears to be the reduction of the
corporate income tax rate. The Act cuts the corporate tax rate from
thirty-five percent to twenty-one percent-a cut slated to cost the
United States an estimated $1.3 trillion.13 2 As discussed in Part I.C,
bringing the corporate tax rate into parity with other similarly situated
jurisdictions is a prudent step in deterring firms from inverting.
However, the Act does more than merely cut the corporate tax rate.
Notably, the Act shifts from a worldwide system, in which a firm
is taxed on both its foreign and domestic earnings, to a territorial tax
regime.' This shift also brings the U.S. tax code into closer harmony
with the rest of the developed world.'34 Instead of taxing firms'
worldwide income-a major factor in firms' decision to stockpile
foreign earnings overseas-the Act shifts to only taxing income that is
generated stateside.'13  As part of the transition to the territorial scheme,
the Act affords firms that have amassed profits overseas the opportunity
to repatriate their earnings at a one-time rate of about fifteen percent.3 6
Apple, the paragon of a foreign-profit hoarder, has already taken the
130. Esposito, supra note 121, at 713.
131. Eileen Sullivan & Michael Tackett, In Signing Sweeping Tax Bill, Trump
Questions Whether He Is Getting Enough Credit, N.Y. TIMEs (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/1222/us/politics/trump-tax-bill.html.
132. HBR IdeaCast: Breaking Down the New US. Corporate Tax Law, HARV. Bus.
REv. (Dec. 26,2017), https://hbr.org/ideacast/2017/12/breaking-down-the-new-u-s-corporate-
tax-law.
133. Danielle Kurtzleben, The GOP's New Tax Plan Will Affect Everyone, but Will It
Grow the Economy?, NPR (Jan. 14, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/14/577359530/the-
gops-new-tax-plan-will-affect-everyone-but-wil-it-grow-the-economy.
134. Id
13 5. Id
136. Lynnley Browning, IRSIssues Tax Rate Guidance for Stockpiled Foreign Income,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 29,2017), https://www.bloombergquint.com/politics/2017/12/29/irs-issues-
guidance-on-tax-rates-for-stockpiled-foreign-income#gs.9FPfpNA.
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United States up on the offer and announced it would repatriate the
majority of its foreign-held profits, paying $38 billion in taxes.13 1
Of course, by shifting to a territorial scheme, firms that were once
reluctant to advance their operations outside of the United States for
fear of eventually having to pay a high tax when the profits were
returned to the United States will now have incentive to increase their
global activity. The Act, however, does not let global firms evade taxes
entirely. The Act imposes a ten percent minimum base erosion and
anti-avoidance tax (BEAT) on firms' related-party payments to U.S.-
based firms or foreign firms with U.S. income.'38 In theory, the BEAT
provision should enable the United States to capture some earnings of
firms conducting business abroad, but due to the complex nature of
multinational firms and their interactions with foreign tax jurisdictions,
there is ample room for firms to plan around the BEAT. Additionally,
some commentators question whether the BEAT violates World Trade
Organization rules.'39
The final aspect of the Act relevant to this discussion is the Act's
new rules concerning capital expenditure deductions. Under the Act,
finns can immediately write off capital expenditures in full, rather than
spreading the deduction out over time as under the previous regime.'4 0
This is significant. The motivation behind such a rule is clear: to
catalyze investment in the United States, both domestically and from
abroad. In theory, this makes sense. The ability to immediately deduct
in full capital expenditures that would otherwise usually take some time
to translate into profit will be alluring to firms--especially in the short
term.
President Trump, when he signed the Act, claimed that as a result
of the Act, companies will make "tremendous investments" in the
137. Daisuke Wakabayashi & Brian X. Chen, Apple, Capitalizing on New Tax Law,
Plans to Bring Billions in Cash Back to US., N.Y. TIMEs (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/01/17/technology/apple-tax-bill-repatriate-cash.html.
138. Erez I. Tucner& William B. Sherman, Main Effects of US. Tax Reform on Foreign
Taxpayers, HOLLAND&KNIGfr (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.hklaw.com/publications/main-
effects-of-us-tax-reform-on-foreign-taxpayers-0 1-02-2018/; Andrew Velarde, Senate Wins on
Base Erosion; Interest Limitation Dropped, TAxNoTEs (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.taxnotes.
com/tax-notes/tax-reform/senate-wins-base-erosion-interest-limitation-dropped/2018/01/01/1
xfyn?highlight-Erosion.
139. Stephanie Soong Johnston, EUFinance Ministers Fire Warning Shot on U.S. Tax
Reform, TAXNOTES (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-international/tax-
reform/eu-finance-ministers-fire-waning-shot-us-tax-reform/2017/12/18/lxdv7.
140. Dave Danic, New Capital Expense Rules for 2018, SUMMIT CPA GRouP (Jan. 30,
2018), https://www.summitcpa.net/blog/new-capital-expense-rules-for-2018.
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United States.14 1 However, some commentators question such
claims.'4 2 The United Kingdom recently lowered its corporate income
tax rate to nineteen percent but has yet to see a marked increase in
investment or wage growth."'3 To the extent that other measures of the
Act might increase investment, it is more likely that the Act will merely
accelerate investment that would have eventually happened, not
necessarily create investment.'"
It appears, at least in the short term, that the Act may curtail
inversions. However, lurking behind the question of whether
inversions will slow after the Act is whether the overhaul of the
corporate tax code will achieve its intended effect. It appears that the
goal of the Act was to make the United States more competitive with
other nations in the market for firms shopping for lower corporate tax
rates. This change may staunch the U.S. hemorrhage of domestically
domiciled firms, but given the speed of drafting and passage,
unintended consequences are likely to surface.'4 5
Ultimately, the Act may prove to be but a mere sideshow that
hides who holds the power in the globalized market. It also provides
the perfect example of how sovereignty has flipped: no longer must
corporate citizens capitulate to the state. Rather, states must now
capitulate to the demands of its corporate citizens to maintain their
fagades of inherent power, including demands for tax cuts in the United
States, the world's largest economy. Perhaps by providing incentives
to firms, this tax cut may succeed in walling them into their U.S.
domicile.
IV. THE FUTILITY OF BUILDING WALLS
Wendy Brown's work on the futility of walls gives us a much
fuller perspective on the inversion phenomenon. Brown defines the
paradox of contemporary life: "What we have come to call a globalized
141. President Donald Trump, Remarks at Signing of H.R. 1, Tax Cuts and Jobs Bill
Act, and H.R. 1370 (Dec. 22, 2017) (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-signing-h-r-1-tax-cuts-jobs-bill-act-h-r-1370/).
142. HBR IdeaCast, supra note 132.
143. Martin Wolf, Donald Trump Has Been Lucky with the U.S. Economy, FIN. TIMES
(Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/2346a2d4-0297-1 1e8-9650-9cOad2d7c5b5.
144. See HBR: IdeaCast, supra note 132.
145. The increase of U.S. firms opting for lower tax jurisdictions has been well
documented. See, e.g., Gregory Wallace, More Companies Bail on US. for Lower Taxes,
CNNMONEY (July 7,2014), https://money.cnn.com/2014/07/07/news/economy/tax-advantage-
inversion/index.html; Tracking Tax Runaways, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/
graphics/tax-inversion-tracker/ (last updated Mar. 1, 2017).
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world harbors fundamental tensions between opening and barricading,
fusion and partition, erasure and reinscription. These tensions
materialize as increasingly liberalized borders, on the one hand, and the
devotion of unprecedented funds, energies, and technologies to border
fortification, on the other." 14 6  This paradox accounts for the
simultaneous desire of market actors to traverse boundaries and that of
states to restrain parties from going outside of their jurisdiction. It
reminds us that globalization is not a cost-free proposition: it
undermines state power.
Prior to the market changes of the past three decades, the
Westphalian concept that state power controls all law, commerce, and
interaction with the outside world reigned supreme and faced little
challenge. Before the expansion of globalism, countries could regulate
and tax firms as well as restrict citizens with few challenges to their
control. Many still believe states hold this power, despite their
diminishing dominion. However, "[a]ll countries are today embedded
in the same system, which subjects them all to the same pressures: and
it is these that are squeezing and warping national political life
everywhere."1 4 7
States that cling to the illusion of their absolute dominion over
citizens and resources may erect walls to protect what they purport to
own.
148 Walls may be of a physical nature, such as the Berlin Wall or
President Trump's proposed wall with Mexico.149 Such walls
necessarily inspire tunnels, flyovers, and other means of
circumvention. Indeed, consider the existing U.S. barrier with Mexico,
under which drug cartels have dug tunnels and erected their own gates
to control access to the tunnels.'s Legislation, such as the Smoot-
Hawley Act, or recent Republican proposals on immigration, also
erects "walls" to keep financial capital in, or to keep human capital
out.151
146. BRowN, supra note 12, at 7-8.
147. Rana Dasgupta, The Demise of the Nation State, GUARDIAN (Apr. 5, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/apr/05/demise-of-the-nation-state-rana-dasgupta.
148. Id. ("But the current appeal of ... wall-building and xenophobia, the mythology
and race theory, the fantastical promises of national restoration - these are not cures, but
symptoms of what is slowly revealing itself to all: nation states everywhere are in an advanced
state of political and moral decay from which they cannot individually extricate themselves.").
149. See Vanderbilt, supra note 21.
150. BROw, supra note 12, at 112.
151. Ruchir Sharma, When Borders Close, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2016), https://www.
nytimes.com/2016/11/13/opinion/sunday/when-borders-close.html.
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Various disparate threats undermine sovereignty, and restrictions
from within a country invite subversion. Borders allow competition
from abroad, while the online world creates a radical transparency of
markets. The globalization of trade means states cannot protect their
own industries from foreign competition. Distant phenomena-from
weather to regulation-can create radical shifts within domestic
markets. Online threats, whether those of a competitive or a criminal
nature, threaten nations as much, if not more, than weapons do. The
move toward online commerce exposes entire industries to constant
pricing pressure.152 States face competition not only from outside the
state, but also from within, which undermines the state's ability to
generate tax revenue and regulate commerce.
How states react to globalization exposes the paradox Brown
describes. While states sometimes embrace the openness ushered in by
globalization, all too often globalization invites the erection of walls.
Citizens presume the state is still omnipotent and politicians appear
loath to disabuse them of that fantasy. Politicians consequently
demand protections for various constituencies from the threats of the
globalized economy. Early in this century, the administration of
President George W. Bush imposed a steel tariff, which was summarily
repealed after a loss before the World Trade Organization (WTO).'"
Likewise, President Trump has proposed a variety of tariffs, many of
which seem to violate WTO law, and none of which finds much support
among economists.' 54 For other nation-states, their vulnerability to
firm power depends on their integration with other economies, their
level of development, and their size.
Brown describes a specific wall between the United States and
Mexico to prevent undocumented migration and drugs from crossing
the border.' These walls are often inherently ineffective because they
do very little to reduce demand for whatever requires crossing the wall.
Tunnels, boats, planes, and other ways around the wall's surface allow
supply to meet demand. On the United States-Mexico border, Brown
describes that one part of the wall has a tunnel, and the gang that built
the tunnel patrols it and operates it to prevent people from using the
152. Ibrahiim Bayaan, E-Commerce Continues to Pressure Retailers from All Sides,
and Freight and Logistics May Never Be the Same, FREIGHTWAVES (Feb. 21, 2018), https://
www.freightwaves.com/news/economics/e-commerce-continues-to-pressure-retailers.
153. Doug Palmer, Why Steel Tariffs Failed When Bush Was President, PoLYTCo (Mar.
7,2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/03/07/steel-tariffs-trump-bush-391426.
154. See id
155. BROwN, supra note 12, at 35.
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tunnel without paying the gang.15 6 From the perspective of the state
that built the wall-the United States-all this activity undermines the
policy purpose of the wall in the first place. It is a nearly Sisyphean
task.
Such futility seems to await efforts to restrict inversions. States
face a great deal of competition in regulation. Internally, a state must
listen to the regulatory demands of citizens if it wishes to maintain its
authority. As discussed in Part II.C, nations also face fierce competition
from other states for subjects in our globalized world. As depicted in
Figure 1, nations are further pressured by traveling corporations to
promulgate business-friendly regulations. In addition, through various
agreements and treaties, states must also adhere to several international
compacts that restrict regulations. 15 7 Just as surely as firms want to
lower their cost structures, the supply of lower tax jurisdictions exists.
Restrictions may complicate inversion efforts, but they may prove
unsuccessful in the long run. The most promising reform is the
harmonization of laws so that across borders, the same or similar
constraints operate to restrict behavior.
V. INVERSIONS AND DEGLOBALIZATION
The movement of people, goods, and services across borders has
always waxed and waned.' The first wave of globalization took place
in the early twentieth century along with the rise of container ships, the
telegraph, and increased immigration."' At that time, economic
integration reached levels that approach today's globalization with
regard to the mobility of capital, goods, and labor.6 o When the 1929
stock market crash led to a full economic depression, the United States
responded by passing protectionist laws that only aggravated the
economic decline and spread it to other countries with the passage of
the Smoot-Hawley TariffAct.' 1
156. Id. at 112.
157. See, e.g., Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054;
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418; KORUS FTA, supra
note 35.
158. Sharma, supra note 151.
159. Id.
160. Laurence Chandy & Brina Seidel, Is Globalization's Second Wave About to
Break?, BROOKINGS (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/is-globalizations-
second-wave-about-to-break/.
161. Id
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Global trade only recovered from those trade restrictions in the
1970s. 162 Even so, it was not until the 1990s, aided by the opening of
Eastern Europe to trade, that the flow of cross-border capital
rebounded.1 63 The similarities between the deglobalization that started
in 1914 and today are clear. Today, global trade demand is low and the
flow of capital is slipping,1" and net migration is down, despite various
recent refugee crises."'
While the most recent spike in globalization has led to great
prosperity for some, it has also contributed significantly to an increase
in economic inequality across the globe.16 Inverting firms have raised
doubts about our globalized economy. The groundswell of support for
protectionist policies the world over marks the cresting of
globalization. Globalization may mutate, or the world may deglobalize
to some extent. Outsourcing, inversions, and other shifts of corporate
resources out of the United States may have provoked this growing
hostility towards the global economy.
In two stunning democratic elections, voters on both sides of the
Atlantic preferred an isolationist view to one of continued
globalization.16 7 The anti-globalism trend shows little sign of slowing
as contenders in other elections successfully campaign on nationalist
platforms.168 These votes reflect the depth of anxiety provoked by
162. See id
163. See id
164. See id.
165. Sharma, supra note 151 ("Despite the flood of refugees into Europe, net migration
from poor to rich countries decreased to 12 million between 2011 and 2015, down by four
million from the previous five years. Between 2009 and 2014, the number of Mexicans leaving
the United States outnumbered new arrivals by 140,000, and that was before Trump's first anti-
Mexican tirades.").
166. See Larry Elliott, World's Eight Richest People Have Same Wealth as Poorest
50%, GUARDIAN (Jan. 15,2017), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/jan/
16/worlds-eight-richest-people-have-same-wealth-as-poorest-50.
167. See Cas Mudde, The Revenge of the Losers of Globalization? Brexit, Trump and
Globalization, HUFFINGTON PosT, https://www.huffingtonpostcom/cas-mudde/the-revenge-
of-the-losers b 11407468.html (last updated Dec. 6, 2017).
168. See e.g., Joe Warmington, Kevin O'Leary: Next Election Will Be an "Exorcism,"
TORONTO SUN (Jan. 18, 2017), https://torontosun.com/2017/01/18/kevin-oleary-next-election-
will-be-an-exorcism/wcm/54a0c247-5d6d-41cO-909e-3e76fa2017a9 (noting that conservative
candidate Kevin O'Leary campaigned as "Trudeau's worst nightmare" in the election for
Canadian Prime Minister). Although Marine Le Pen lost the 2017 French presidential election,
there was sufficient support to force a runoff election. Ingrid Melander, Le Pen Kicks Off
Campaign with Promise of French "Freedom," REUTERS (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-france-election-fi/le-pen-kicks-off-campaign-with-promise-of-french-
freedom-idUSKBN15J07; France Elections: Macron and Le Pen Through to Run-off BBC
NEWS (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39686993.
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globalization. As developed democracies stagnate and become
increasingly xenophobic, the most successful political leaders seem to
be those espousing a nationalist message. In the United States, this has
led to expanding the use of military power and erecting physical
barriers such as the proposed wall with Mexico.16 9 As in the 1930s, a
retreat from trade and immigration can only raise costs and reduce
economic activity.'70
As Wendy Brown's book suggests, building walls rarely achieves
the goal of cutting off access to the other side."' Attempts by the
United States to limit immigration and wall off trade will either fail or
come with significant burdens that dwarf the costs of cross-border
movement of goods and labor. Building walls to block mobility for the
largest multinationals will not come cheaply.
Traveling corporations will not cede power back to states so
readily. The Internet fosters this radical increase of firm power, as
cybertrade enables individuals to provide or receive services
worldwide without leaving home. Unless the United States and other
countries adopt autarkic Internet regulations that cut the country off
from the online world, the Internet will likely retain the power to
circumvent local rules and norms.'72 As traveling corporations avoid
tax liability through clever maneuvering, firms can use the Internet to
shift the jurisdictional hold on their transactions away from states that
impose other liabilities. As Anupam Chander has inquired, "[I]s law
itself at risk, now avoidable by a mere single click?"'73 In such a world,
corporate power may continue unchecked, leaving workers and
consumers operating in a world ruled by corporations.
VI. CONCLUSION
Inversions subvert sovereignty and upend the relationship
between the public and the private. As recent political events suggest,
they may have pushed globalization too far. Few solutions seem
promising and neither physical nor regulatory walls succeed at keeping
capital, goods, or labor from crossing political borders. Tax incentives
may soon decrease the number of inversions because firms may come
169. See Vanderbilt, supra note 21.
170. See Sharma, supra note 151.
171. BROWN, supra note 12.
172. See ANUPAM CHANDER, THE ELECTRONIC SLK ROAD: How THE WEB BINDs THE
WORLD TOGETHER IN COMMERCE 5-6 (2013).
173. Id. at 5.
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to more greatly value the pleasures of home, or at least fear the political
risk of leaving home. Regardless, legal remedies, as they appear now,
seem ill-suited to the task.
Ever since the first inversions began in the mid-1980s, Congress
has tried to find a way to effectively protect the United States' tax base.
While some congressional efforts have proven useful in the short term,
inversions continue to be an unremitting problem as firms become
increasingly sophisticated. Cross-border mergers involve increasing
complexity as multiple parties, various governments, and
heterogeneous constituencies jockey for influence. While inversions
often undermine state power, easily controverted solutions like walls
will continue to prove futile. The tax code has failed to stop firms from
leaving the United States, and non-tax law alternatives as of yet show
little chance of success.
As states hold less and less power in our globalized and
interconnected world, both states and citizens prefer to avoid the frank
assessment of national decline, which only confirms their collective
powerlessness and impotence with regard to mass capital. Close
attention to limiting inversions may yield pluralist approaches that
embrace both cross-border cooperation and sophisticated domestic
legislation-remedies that may yet revive the state's potency in the
face of its seemingly unstoppable "prey."
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